JOINT DOCTRINE

Joint Force Employment

Intelligence Support To Operations

J-7 OPERATIONAL PLANS AND INTEROPERABILITY DIRECTORATE

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PREFACE

This briefing is one of the publications comprising the Joint Doctrine Joint Force Employment Briefing Modules. It has been specifically designed as a definitive briefing guide for joint doctrine presentations and focuses on intelligence support to operations. Discussion will include the many aspects of intelligence, including the definition and sources, the intelligence cycle, the role intelligence plays in joint operations, planning, basic principles, target intelligence, and finally the principles of multinational intelligence. All the material found in the joint doctrine Joint Force Employment Briefing Modules is drawn directly from approved joint doctrine, without interpretation, and may be reproduced and distributed to advance a better understanding of joint warfare and the principles of joint doctrine.

The module is organized into two main sections. The first section contains slides and a briefing script. A briefing slide is depicted on the left hand page along with its accompanying script on the facing page. The particular Joint Doctrine Publication from which the material is drawn is identified as **(Source)** on the briefing script. Appendix A contains an outline of the briefing script.

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Section I

Intelligence Support To Operations
Briefing Slides and Script



Slide 1. Introduction to Intelligence

Introduction to Intelligence

There is no doubt that intelligence support is critical to operational success. For this reason, Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations," is one of the six keystone doctrines designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

Joint intelligence doctrine offers two perspectives. The first is the joint force commander's (JFC's) perspective of the uses of intelligence and the responsibilities and capabilities of Intelligence Staff (J-2) and supporting intelligence organizations. Second is the J-2's perspective of the end toward which intelligence must work.

From the moment joint operations are contemplated, the JFC launches a continuing, interactive process to develop and refine the commander's estimate of the situation. The J-2 and J-2 staff have pivotal responsibilities in this process, both in direct support of the commander and in interactions with the other J-staffs. At all stages, the J-2 and J-2 staff must contribute not only relevant intelligence but also a sophisticated understanding of how the adversary thinks.

Critical to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace. All sides will attempt to determine adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts. All sides will deploy their collection and analysis capabilities and will endeavor to conduct successful deceptions in attempts to gain surprise and provide operations security. Gaining and maintaining this intelligence dominance enhances the JFC's flexibility by opening additional operational options.

Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC's guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives. The commander's requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products. Ultimately, satisfying these requirements will depend on the ability of each J-2 and their intelligence staffs at all levels of command to (1) employ joint force organic intelligence resources; (2) identify and, when assigned, integrate additional intelligence resources such as the joint intelligence center; and (3) apply national intelligence capabilities. **(JP 2-0, Chapter I, para 1)**



Slide 2. The Role of Intelligence

The Role of Intelligence

The role intelligence plays in full-dimensional operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and when that end state has been achieved.

Intelligence's most important role is assisting JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace. Visualization includes more than having knowledge of the physical and manmade characteristics of the operational areas; it requires knowing the current dispositions and activities of adversary forces in that space and knowing the current and future capabilities of adversary forces to operate in and across each battlespace dimension. More importantly, it requires understanding the adversary's objectives.

Determining the intent of adversary leaders is the most difficult challenge confronting intelligence. The most important factor that causes determining intent to be so difficult is the process of action and reaction that will occur between a joint force and its adversary. Friendly actions or even preparations will, if detected, cause a reaction by the adversary. This has been referred to as the "process of interaction." Estimating the outcome of the "process of interaction" requires the intelligence officer to know what future friendly actions are planned and then to simultaneously forecast many different factors involved in the actions. **(JP 2-0, Chapter I, para 1)**

During **peacetime operations**, intelligence helps commanders make acquisition choices, protect technological advances, shape organizations, and design training to ready the joint force. Intelligence assets monitor foreign states and volatile regions to identify threats to US interests in time for the National Command Authorities (NCA) to respond effectively, efficiently, and in a manner consistent with US values. Information shortfalls are identified and eliminated. Intelligence units are employed or deployed as early as directed to support US initiatives and assist allies. Forces not deployed train for military operations other than war (MOOTW) and war.

During MOOTW, intelligence helps the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. Although supporting the effort to reduce or eliminate sources of conflict, intelligence constantly prepares for escalation to war.

During **wartime**, intelligence tells the JFC what the adversary's information capabilities are and where and when the information differential can be exploited. Intelligence tells the JFC what the adversary's centers of gravity are and assists the operational planner in identifying best means for attacking them. Intelligence enables the JFC to focus and leverage combat power and to determine acceptable risk. It is the key to allowing the JFC to achieve powerful, dynamic concentrations where the adversary is vulnerable. In wartime, it is important that support is anticipatory and precise. Intelligence must maximize and synchronize its support to the JFC while minimizing the demands made on the JFC. **(JP 2-0, Chapter I, para 2)**



Slide 3. Tenets of Intelligence

Tenets of Intelligence

The **tenets of intelligence** are the fundamental standards against which performance of intelligence personnel and organizations must be judged. A failure to achieve any one of these fundamental attributes may contribute to a failure of operations. The bottom line is whether the commander's priority information requirements (PIR) are being satisfied.

Timeliness. Intelligence must be available when the commander requires it. Late intelligence is as useless as no intelligence. Timely intelligence enables the commander to anticipate events in the operational area. This enables the commander to time operations for maximum effectiveness and to avoid being surprised.

Accuracy. To be accurate, intelligence must be objective. It must be free from any political or other constraint and must not be distorted by pressure to conform with the positions held by higher levels of command. Intelligence products must not be shaped to conform to any perceptions of the commander's preferences. While intelligence is a factor in determining policy, policy must not determine intelligence.

Usability. Intelligence must be tailored to the specific needs of the commander and provided in forms suitable for immediate comprehension. The commander must be able to quickly apply intelligence to the task at hand. Providing useful intelligence requires the producers to understand the circumstances under which their products are used.

Completeness. Complete intelligence answers the commander's questions about the adversary to the fullest degree possible. It also tells the commander what remains unknown. To be complete, intelligence must identify all the adversary's capabilities. It must inform the commander of the possible courses of action that are available to the adversary commander. When justified by the available evidence, intelligence must forecast future adversary actions and intentions.

Relevance. Intelligence must be relevant to the planning and execution of the operation at hand. It must aid the commander in the accomplishment of the command's mission. Intelligence must contribute to the commander's understanding of the adversary. It must help the commander decide how to accomplish the assigned mission without being unduly hindered by the adversary. **(JP 2-0, Chapter II, para 3)**



Slide 4. Levels of Intelligence

Levels of Intelligence

There are three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels are a doctrinal concept that explain the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. The levels of war assist commanders in visualizing a logical flow of operations, allocating resources, and assigning tasks. The **levels of intelligence** mirror the levels of war.

Strategic intelligence is produced for the NCA, the senior military leaders, and the combatant commanders. It is used to create national strategy and policy, monitor the international situation, prepare military plans, determine major weapon systems and force structure requirements, and conduct strategic operations. It applies across the range of military operations, including MOOTW.

Operational intelligence is primarily used by combatant and subordinate joint force commanders and their component commanders. Operational intelligence focuses on the military capabilities and intentions of adversaries and potential adversaries. It keeps JFCs abreast of events within their areas of responsibility and determines when, where, and in what strength the adversary will stage and conduct campaigns and major operations. Within the theater, operational intelligence addresses the full range of military operations, including operations other than war.

Tactical intelligence is used by tactical level commanders for planning and conducting battles and engagements. Tactical intelligence locates the adversary's forces and weapon systems, enhancing the tactical commander's ability to shape the battlespace with maneuver, fires, and obstacles. Accurate, timely intelligence allows tactical units to achieve positional advantage over their adversaries. Tactical intelligence addresses threat across the range of military operations, including MOOTW. **(JP 2-0, Chapter III, para 2)**



Slide 5. The Intelligence Cycle

The Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. Department of Defense users include the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders (CINCs), and all other commanders and forces.

The US intelligence cycle has the following six steps: planning and direction; collection, processing and exploitation; production; dissemination and integration; and evaluation. The intelligence cycle is a highly simplified model of intelligence operations in terms of processes. As a model, it is important to note that intelligence actions do not always follow sequentially through the cycle. For instance, a request for imagery causes activity in the planning and direction step but may not involve new collection, going instead to a production facility where imagery is drawn from an archive. The intelligence cycle, however, presents intelligence activities as a structure for the discussion of intelligence doctrine.

To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence. Both information and intelligence are important, and both may exist together in some form. They are not, however, the same thing, and thus they have different connotations, applicability, and credibility.

Planning and Direction Phase.

In the planning and direction phase, the direction for current and future intelligence operations is established by the commander's PIR and by the J-2's supporting information requirements (IR). Using the PIR and IR as guidance, intelligence personnel then perform the necessary planning for how best to collect the information needed to satisfy the requirements. PIR are those intelligence requirements that the commander has specifically stated have priority.

Collection planning matches requests for intelligence with the appropriate collection capabilities. It also synchronizes the timing of collection with the operational scheme of maneuver. Collection planning registers, validates, and prioritizes all collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements. It results in requirements being tasked or submitted to the appropriate organic, attached, and supporting external organizations and agencies. The taskings take the form of the command's collection plan.

Planning and direction also entails determining the intelligence organizational and equipment requirements and creating the necessary intelligence architecture. How the joint force J-2 will be organized and where it will be established are critical decisions that must be made early in the planning process.

Collection Phase.

During the collection phase, those intelligence sources identified in the collection plan collect information about the adversary. The collected information is then provided to processing and exploitation elements.

Intelligence sources are the means or systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. There are five primary intelligence disciplines: imagery intelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence, and open-source intelligence. **(JP 2-0, Chapter II, para 3)**

Processing and Exploitation Phase.

During this phase, raw information is converted to forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts in the production phase. Processing and exploitation actions include initial interpretation, data conversion and correlation, document translation, and decryption. Also included are reporting the results of these actions to production elements. Process and exploitation may be performed by the same element that collected the information. An example of processing and exploitation is taking the technical parameters detected by a SIGINT collection system and associating the parameters with a particular radar system. Rather than having to deal with raw data, the analyst is provided with the essential fact — the identity of the radar.

Production Phase.

This is the most critical phase of the intelligence cycle. During the production phase, all available processed information is integrated, analyzed, evaluated, and interpreted to create products that will satisfy the commander's PIR. Intelligence products can be presented in many forms. They may be oral presentations, hard copy publications, or electronic media.

Dissemination and Integration Phase.

During this phase, intelligence is delivered to and used by the consumer. Dissemination can be by a variety of means. This means must be determined by the needs of the user. Briefings, video-teleconferences, telephone calls, FAX transmissions, electronic messages, and remote terminal access to computer data bases and direct data transfers are all forms of dissemination.

Evaluation Phase.

During the evaluation phase, intelligence personnel at all levels assess how well each phase of the intelligence cycle is being performed. When areas are identified that need improvement, the necessary changes are made. The tenets of intelligence are the fundamental standards against which performance of intelligence personnel and organizations must be judged. The bottom line is whether the commander's PIR are being satisfied. **(JP 2-0, Chapter II, para 3)**

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

Slide 6. Responsibilities of the Joint Force J-2

Responsibilities of the Joint Force J-2

To accomplish the tasks required of intelligence operations, the J-2s at all levels have the following major responsibilities:

Participate in all Decision Making and Planning. Using the intelligence estimate as a basis, the J-2 participates in the JFC's decision making and planning processes from the time that operations are first contemplated or directed until the completion of the operation.

Synchronize Intelligence With Operations. The J-2 synchronizes all intelligence activities and functions with the JFC's operational scheme of maneuver. The employment of intelligence assets must be applied to provide maximum support at the critical times in the JFC's plan.

Develop Detailed Intelligence Plans. The JFC's PIR and the results of wargaming serve as the basis for the intelligence plan. The plan will list the JFC's PIR and the supporting IR. If will identify the intelligence forces available for the operation and assign tasks that will best support the JFC's requirements.

Plan to Use Operational Forces for Collection. Information from reconnaissance and surveillance units and elements that will be in contact with the adversary must be integrated with intelligence from other sources. Forward and engaged combat forces must be tasked to collect and report information.

Use Intelligence Lessons Learned When Planning. The J-2 should take advantage of the lessons learned during other joint operations to benefit from significant operations, training, and intelligence experience. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System is designed for this purpose and should be used.

Establish a Joint Intelligence Architecture. A truly joint intelligence infrastructure must be created to provide the best possible intelligence to the JFC. The joint force command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) structure required to support the JFC's concept of operation must be identified during the planning or pre-deployment phases.

Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort. For a particular area of interest, there should be unity of intelligence effort to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication.

Structure for Continuous Operations. Intelligence organizations should be structured for continuous day-night and all-weather operations. The J-2's concept of intelligence operations should provide for continuity of support even if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost. Intelligence resources, activities, and communications must be structured and operated to be sufficiently survivable to ensure required intelligence support is available to the JFC.

Maintain Flexibility. Intelligence structures, methodologies, data bases, products, and personnel must be flexible to meet changing operational situations, needs, priorities, and opportunities, and they must serve all possible strategies and tactics.

Integrate National and Theater Intelligence Support. The J-2 must plan for integrating national and theater intelligence elements and products into the joint force's intelligence structure. National and theater intelligence organizations will make operations feasible that could not be accomplished without their access, capability, capacity, or expertise.

Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence. The J-2 must ensure that intelligence is readily accessible to the JFC and other members of the joint force while still adhering to security standards of need-to-know and protection of classified information and intelligence sources and methods. **(JP 2-0, Chapter III, para 4)**

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

Slide 7. Joint Intelligence Architecture

Joint Intelligence Architecture

Since a JFC must be capable of coordinating the actions of people, organizations, and resources at a great distance, the **joint intelligence architecture** is critical. This intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure capable of providing global access to an information grid that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. It is configured to provide access to all intelligence sources from anywhere on the earth and to provide the baseline data needed to support JFCs at all levels.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), supported by the national and military intelligence organizations, is responsible for establishing and maintaining the joint intelligence architecture at the national level and the CINCs are responsible for it for their commands. **(JP 2-0, Chapter IV, para 1)**

The joint intelligence architecture is integral to each phase of the intelligence cycle, from Planning and Direction through Evaluation. The architecture supports intelligence functions over a distributed global network employing communications systems, computers, space-based C4I support systems, and their associated resources and technologies. **(JP 2-0, Chapter IV, para 2)**

There are certain requirements that the joint intelligence architecture needs to fill for it to be successful. First it must be capable of being tailored to support a specific JFC's information requirements. The architecture must ensure that no source of information collection, production, or dissemination is subject to a single point of failure. It must be capable of accommodating the widest possible range of missions and operational scenarios. It is important that it achieve a seamless integration of the JFC's decision making and execution cycles with all phases of the intelligence cycle. The architecture must be developed so that users can train and exercise with intelligence capabilities in peacetime. It must include current technology and be capable of incorporating new and emerging technologies as they become available. Finally, the intelligence architecture must provide for integration with the existing and projected teleconferencing capabilities of C4I systems. **(JP 2-0, Chapter IV, para 3)**

The standards for the joint intelligence architecture are as follows:

Survivable: The architecture must be as survivable as the command structure it supports.

Interoperable: The architecture must be designed to accommodate interoperability and integration with existing and projected intelligence information systems.

Secure: Information must be protected according to a developed intelligence architecture security policy.

Compatible: The architecture must use common data elements when reengineering existing systems or applications and developing new systems. **(JP 2-0, Chapter IV, para 4)**



Slide 8. National Intelligence Support

National Intelligence Support

We know that it is the job of the J-2 to provide the JFC with timely and accurate intelligence. However, in almost every situation, the J-2 will not be capable of satisfying the commander's requirements using only the intelligence resources assigned to the joint force and its components. In most situations, even the theater-level intelligence system will be incapable of meeting all the commander's needs. The J-2 will have to rely upon national-level intelligence organizations for support. **(JP 2-02, Chapter I, para 1)**

National intelligence organizations operate extensive collection, processing, and dissemination systems. They have broad, often unique, analytical capabilities. These intelligence organizations employ specialized resources and dedicated personnel to gain information about potential adversaries, events, and other worldwide intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-02, Chapter I, para 2)**

While national-level intelligence organizations can and will provide support to the JFC, they must continue to support national-level decision makers. The focus of these national organizations is not evenly split between the two customers and varies according to the situation. Successful national-level support to JFCs depends upon efficient and effective cooperation and interoperability, not only vertically but horizontally, as well. **(JP 2-02, Chapter I, para 4)**

Representatives from some national-level intelligence organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, DIA, National Security Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, and State Department, support the combatant commanders on a full time basis and are located at command headquarters. These representatives provide liaison with their parent organizations and serve as the J-2's advisor on how to best employ their organization's capabilities. **(JP 2-02, Chapter I, para 4)**



Slide 9. Intelligence Planning

Intelligence Planning

The essence of effective planning is the full definition of the mission, expression of the commander's intent, completion of the commander's estimate, and development of a concept of operations. The planning effort must be focused to ensure that it is responsive to the commander's requirements and the requirements of subordinate units and/or elements. Sharing operational, communications, and intelligence information among the J-2, operations officer, logistics officer, plans officer, and command, control, communications, and computer systems officer is essential. Let us now discuss some elements of intelligence planning.

Joint operation plans include operation plans (OPLANs),operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs) with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), functional plans, campaign plans, and operation orders (OPORDs). The different processes involved (deliberate planning, crisis action planning (CAP), and campaign planning) are interrelated. We will discuss these processes on the next slides.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides the means to respond to emerging crisis situations or transition to war through rapid, coordinated execution planning and implementation. JOPES translates policy decisions into OPLANs and OPORDs. **(JP 2-01, Chapter II, para 1)**



Slide 10. Intelligence Planning Process 1: Deliberate Planning

Intelligence Planning Process 1: Deliberate Planning

The next three slides will cover the planning process with relation to intelligence in the areas of deliberate, crisis action, and campaign planning.

Intelligence planners support the deliberate planning process, which prepares for a possible contingency based on the best available information. Conducted primarily in peacetime, the deliberate planning process engages the entire joint planning community in the methodical development of plans for all contingencies, and the transition to and from war.

During Phase I, **Initiation**, the Services provide information to the supported commands on available intelligence forces and supplies required to support the plan. The Services also keep the combatant commander informed on Service intelligence plans and programs.

Phase II, **Concept Development,** involves development of the supported commander's concept of the operation, documented as the CINC's Strategic Concept. The intelligence staff supports the development of alternative courses of action (COAs) by collecting and analyzing already existing information to produce intelligence on the adversary, terrain, meteorological and oceanographic and geographic features that affect friendly and adversary forces through the intelligence preparation of the battlespace process. The CINC's Strategic Concept is forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

The CINC's Strategic Concept provides the basis for plan development by the CINC's staff. In Phase III, **Plan Development**, intelligence staffs are responsible for developing the Intelligence Annex and appendices to the basic OPLAN. Intelligence staffs must also identify intelligence support force and sustainment requirements and identify intelligence shortfalls throughout the planning process for incorporation into the OPLAN. Intelligence assets must be included in the time-phased force and deployment list to ensure proper movement of critical personnel and equipment.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a final review of OPLANs submitted by the supported commander during Phase IV, **Plan Review**. This review evaluates the plan to determine whether taskings have been met and whether resources have been used effectively within the constraints of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan apportionment guidance. The Joint Staff J-2 reviews the intelligence annex for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Phase V, **Supporting Plans**, deals with mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in support of the concept described in the supported commander's approved plan. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be asked to resolve critical issues, including use of intelligence forces and assets, that arise during the review of supporting plans. The Joint Staff may review any supporting plan on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **(JP 2-01, Chapter II, para 2)**



Slide 11. Intelligence Planning Process 2: Crisis Action Planning

Intelligence Planning Process 2: Crisis Action Planning

The basic planning process is adapted to execute joint operations in crisis situations. **CAP** procedures provide for the transition from planning military operations to actual execution through the timely flow of intelligence, rapid execution of military options, and the timely relay of decisions of the NCA to supported commanders.

Deliberate and crisis action planning for any particular joint operation are interrelated by the degree to which deliberate planning has been able to anticipate and prepare for the crisis. Every crisis situation cannot be anticipated, but detailed analysis and coordination accomplished during the deliberate planning period may greatly expedite effective decision making and execution planning during crises and unanticipated contingencies. Therefore, joint intelligence support for CAP should always begin with a thorough exploitation of relevant deliberate plans.

CAP and execution are accomplished within a framework of six phases. Following are the processes and procedures pertinent to joint intelligence planning during CAP:

Situation development is a dynamic process that evolves simultaneously with policy. Proper situation development demands that staffs be able to provide advice within approximately 12 hours to commanders, based on deliberate planning. A principal task of the combatant command's J-2 is to help develop the commander's situation assessment. The intelligence effort focuses on intelligence collection and production to illuminate the situation for the combatant commander, components, JFC, NCA, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The situation development phase ends when the CINC's assessment is submitted to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During Phase II, **crisis assessment**, the NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation assessment and determine whether a military option should be prepared. This phase requires increased information gathering and analysis, particularly with respect to potential strategic lift destinations. Therefore, the combatant command J-2 must work closely with national agencies to help define and then answer the emerging information requirements of the senior leadership and answer the commander's PIR. The crisis assessment phase ends with a decision by the NCA to return to the pre-crisis state or to have military options developed for consideration and possible use. The NCA decision provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include specific guidance on the COAs to be developed.

Phase III, **COA development**, implements an NCA decision or CJCS planning directive to develop military options. The supported commander analyzes each COA and provides recommendations to the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This phase ends with submission of the supported commander's estimate, which includes the intelligence estimate.

Two critical events highlight Phase IV, **COA selection**: selection of a COA by the NCA and initiation of execution planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews and evaluates the combatant commander's estimate and prepares recommendations and advice for the NCA. The NCA selects a COA and directs that execution planning be accomplished.

An alert order implements the NCA decision and contains sufficient detail to allow the JFC to conduct detailed planning. A CJCS planning order could be issued to initiate execution planning before the NCA selects a COA. The subordinate joint force J-2 planning action focus shifts to the COA selected by the NCA.

Phase V, **execution planning**, begins with receipt of the alert order or planning order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The approved COA is transformed into an OPORD. Detailed planning occurs throughout the joint planning community. If required, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already developed. The supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or developing a new plan. This phase ends with an NCA decision to implement the OPORD. In those instances where the crisis does not progress to implementation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance on continued planning using either deliberate or crisis action planning procedures.

If the NCA decide to execute the selected COA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an execute order during Phase VI, **execution**. This phase continues until the crisis or mission ends and force redeployment has been completed. If the crisis is prolonged, the process may be repeated continuously as circumstances change and missions are revised. If the crisis expands to major conflict or war, CAP will evolve into and be absorbed within the larger context of implementation planning for the conduct of the war. **(JP 2-01, Chapter II, para 3)**

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

Slide 12. Intelligence Planning Process 3: Campaign Planning

Intelligence Planning Process 3: Campaign Planning

The theater campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's vision of related major operations required to attain strategic objectives. Campaign planning is appropriate when military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. It encompasses both the deliberate and CAP processes. Intelligence supports all aspects of the campaign plan.

Campaign plans guide the development of supporting OPLANs and OPORDs. COAs are developed and forwarded in the commander's estimate for approval by the NCA. The combatant commander finalizes the campaign plan based on a CJCS alert order, using the approved COA as the centerpiece. Intelligence efforts in support of the campaign plan, including the intelligence annexes, focus on identifying any adversary forces and capabilities in the area of responsibility and/or the joint operations area and the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity. **(JP 2-01, Chapter II, para 4)**



Slide 13. Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S) Support

Geospatial Information and Services Support

The term "geospatial information and services (GI&S)" has recently replaced the term "mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G)." This change was necessitated by an increasing use of digital geospatial information to perform many military functions such as navigation, mission planning and mission rehearsal, targeting, and analysis of the battlespace. Digital geospatial information forms the foundation for battlespace visualization. All aspects of military operations require geospatial information. **(JP 2-03, Chapter I, para 1)**

GI&S is neither a product nor a system, but rather a concept for the collection, production, archiving, dissemination, and exploitation of information about the Earth. The purpose of the geospatial data warehouse is to allow the warfighter to have instant access to the most current and accurate geospatial information available. **(JP 2-03, Chapter I, para 2)**



Slide 14. Intelligence C4 Systems Support

Intelligence C4 Systems Support

Communications and automated data processing (ADP) systems provide the basic framework for the timely movement and transfer of information in each phase of the intelligence cycle to commanders and other key decision makers. Communications and ADP technology is undergoing continuous evolution, affecting intelligence architecture, systems, and applications. This presents challenges regarding operator familiarization, integration and compatibility of systems, and efficient utilization of available resources. These challenges can be overcome through dedicated, professional training and hands-on experience.

Developers, installers, and other ADP professionals must continuously raise the threshold of dynamic support to commanders by successfully creating and refining communications and ADP systems. However, integral to all system development and application is the need for utility — technology is not an end in itself, but the means to process and pass intelligence in support of the commander and the mission. Technological development must be realistically tempered by the limitations of fielded and deployed systems and of the consumers themselves. **(JP 2-01, Chapter IV, para 1)**

Joint Intelligence. Joint intelligence architecture implements common procedures, standards, and streamlined support, and continues to evolve in concert with the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) for the Warrior Concept. This broadly connected joint system provides total battlespace information to the warrior, and establishes a global C4I capability for the warfighter to "plug in" anytime, anywhere, for any mission.

National Agency Communications Support. The Director, DIA, establishes capability and interoperability standards for joint and Service intelligence activities. The Director coordinates planning and programming of intelligence resources, including those for selected ADP systems, telecommunications, and survivability. DIA has established a standard communications architecture that supports joint intelligence operations. The geographic combatant command then takes this standard "package," and in coordination with DIA, builds a theater intelligence architecture based on the mission, CINC guidance, and command requirements. **(JP 2-01, Chapter IV, para 2)**

Combined operations and coalition warfare are now the norm for military operations, making intelligence-sharing with the allies increasingly important**.** A multilevel security system does not currently exist that can easily facilitate sanitization and dissemination of information to US and allied and/or coalition operational commanders. Combatant commands and subordinate joint task forces can request that intelligence reports be made releasable to coalition and/or allied nations as necessary. **(JP 2-01, Chapter IV, para 3)**



Slide 15. Target Intelligence

Target Intelligence

Target intelligence describes components of a target or target system and indicates their vulnerability and relative importance. Intelligence support to targeting includes target system analysis, target development, target selection and nomination, weaponeering, combat assessment (CA), and target material production.

Targeting is the process of developing and selecting targets in response to the commander's guidance, objectives, and the commander's preparation of the battlespace and scenario, and matching the appropriate weapon system to them by taking into account existing operational requirements and capabilities. The targeting cycle concludes with CA, which determines the effectiveness of operations in meeting combat or battle objectives, and is the start of the retasking cycle.

The primary responsibility for targeting resides with the JFC. Targeting entails the analysis of enemy situations relative to the mission, objectives, and the capabilities at the JFC's disposal, in order to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or critical resources. **(JP 2-01.1, Chapter I, para 2)**

Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force by operations and intelligence personnel. It is sometimes complicated by the need to deconflict or synchronize targeting by different units within the joint force. Targeting should be based on campaign goals, intent, guidance, military objectives, and the Law of Armed Conflict, and a thorough understanding of how the adversary state functions.

The targeting process is cyclical and the J-2 provides critical support throughout this process, especially in the areas of target development and CA.

The targeting cycle includes six steps: NCA and/or commander's guidance and objectives; target development; weaponeering assessment; force application; execution planning and force execution; and CA.

NCA and/or Commander's Guidance and Objectives. Guidance and objectives from the NCA, as well as joint force and component commanders, serve to initiate the targeting cycle. Objectives and guidance also drive targeting priorities, establish restrictions for force employment, drive intelligence requirements, and provide criteria to measure objective attainment.

Target Development. This phase focuses on knowing the adversary and identifying and nominating critical elements of adversary target systems for attack. The target development phase involves the systematic evaluation of all-source intelligence to identify potential target systems relevant to the commander's guidance and objectives.

Weaponeering Assessment. In this phase, targeting personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and nonlethal weapons employment against prioritized targets.

Force Application. Force application integrates the results of earlier phases with operations planning data. Force application is conducted at the command, component, and unit level to fuse target, weapon system, munitions, and nonlethal force options. The JFC is provided fused target intelligence and weapon system recommendations against a target system and its vulnerabilities.

Execution Planning and Force Execution. Following the commander's approval of force application recommendations, this next phase involves final tasking order preparation and transmission and specific mission planning as well as material preparation at the unit level.

Combat Assessment. CA is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Battle damage assessment is one of the principal subordinate elements of CA. At the JFC level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign or OPLAN are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC's overall concept. The intent is to analyze what is known about the damage inflicted on the adversary with sound military judgment to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have on the adversary's plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. **(JP 2-01.1, Chapter I, para 3)**

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

Slide 16. Multinational Intelligence Principles

Multinational Intelligence Principles

As our last topic we will consider **multinational intelligence principles**. National interests require the US to act in concert with other nations. In many situations, Armed Forces of the United States will join with foreign military forces to defeat common adversaries or to conduct MOOTW. In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. **(JP 2-0, Appendix A, para 1)**

Because each multinational operation will be unique, there is no fixed set of rules or policies for conducting joint intelligence operations as part of multinational operations. The JFC participating in the coalition or alliance must develop the policy and procedures for that particular operation.

The following general principles provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures:

Maintain Unity of Effort. Intelligence officers of each nation need to view the threat from multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of an alliance or coalition by the common adversary must be considered a threat to all alliance or coalition elements.

Make Adjustments. There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among the coalition partners. Major differences may include how intelligence is provided to the commander or procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.

Plan Early and Plan Concurrently. This permits solutions to differences to be developed and tried before operations begin.

Share All Necessary Information. Coalition members must share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary.

Conduct Complementary Operations. Intelligence efforts of the nations must be complementary, and all intelligence resources must be available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem.



Slide 17. Conclusion

Conclusion

The role intelligence plays in successful operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and determine when that end state has been achieved.

Today I have advised you of many aspects of intelligence including the definition and sources, the intelligence cycle, the role intelligence plays in joint operations, planning, basic principles, target intelligence, and finally the principles of multinational intelligence.

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Section II
Intelligence Support To Operations
Outline of Briefing Script

Intelligence Support To Operations
Outline of Briefing Script

I. Introduction to Intelligence.

A. There is no doubt that intelligence support is critical to operational success. For this reason, Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations," is one of the six keystone doctrines designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

B. Joint intelligence doctrine offers two perspectives.

1. The first is the joint force commander's (JFC's) perspective of the uses of intelligence and the responsibilities and capabilities of Intelligence Staff (J-2) and supporting intelligence organizations.

2. Second is the J-2's perspective of the end toward which intelligence must work.

C. From the moment joint operations are contemplated, the JFC launches a continuing, interactive process to develop and refine the commander's estimate of the situation.

1. The J-2 and J-2 staff have pivotal responsibilities in this process, both in direct support of the commander and in interactions with the other J-staffs.

2. At all stages, the J-2 and J-2 staff must contribute not only relevant intelligence but also a sophisticated understanding of how the adversary thinks.

D. Critical to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace.

1. All sides will attempt to determine adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts.

2. All sides will deploy their collection and analysis capabilities and will endeavor to conduct successful deceptions in attempts to gain surprise and provide operational security. Gaining and maintaining this intelligence dominance enhances the JFC's flexibility by opening additional operational options.

E. Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC's guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives.

1. The commander's requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products.

2. Ultimately, satisfying these requirements will depend on the ability of each J-2 and their intelligence staffs at all levels of command to

a. employ joint force organic intelligence resources;

b. identify and, when assigned, integrate additional intelligence resources such as the joint intelligence center; and

c. apply national intelligence capabilities. **(JP 2-0, Chapter I, para 1)**

II. The Role of Intelligence.

A. The role intelligence plays in full-dimensional operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and when that end state has been achieved.

B. Intelligence's most important role is assisting JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace.

1. Visualization includes more than having knowledge of the physical and manmade characteristics of the operational areas, it requires knowing the current dispositions and activities of adversary forces in that space and knowing the current and future capabilities of adversary forces to operate in and across each battlespace dimension. More importantly, it requires understanding the adversary's objectives.

C. Determining the intent of adversary leaders is the most difficult challenge confronting intelligence.

1. The most important factor that causes determining intent to be so difficult is the process of action and reaction that will occur between a joint force and its adversary.

2. Friendly actions or even preparations will, if detected, cause a reaction by the adversary. This has been referred to as the "process of interaction."

3. Estimating the outcome of the "process of interaction" requires the intelligence officer to know what future friendly actions are planned and then to simultaneously forecast many different factors involved in the actions. **(JP 2-0, Chapter I, para 1)**

D. During **peacetime operations**, intelligence helps commanders make acquisition choices, protect technological advances, shape organizations, and design training to ready the joint force.

1. Intelligence assets monitor foreign states and volatile regions to identify threats to US interests in time for the National Command Authorities (NCA) to respond effectively, efficiently, and in a manner consistent with US values.

2. Information shortfalls are identified and eliminated. Intelligence units are

employed or deployed as early as directed to support US initiatives and assist allies.

3. Forces not deployed train for military operations other than war (MOOTW) and war.

E. During MOOTW, intelligence helps the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. Although supporting the effort to reduce or eliminate sources of conflict, intelligence constantly prepares for escalation to war.

E. During **wartime**, intelligence tells the JFC what the adversary's information capabilities are and where and when the information differential can be exploited.

1. Intelligence tells the JFC what the adversary's centers of gravity are and assists the operational planner in identifying best means for attacking them.

2. Intelligence enables the JFC to focus and leverage combat power and to determine acceptable risk. It is the key to allowing the JFC to achieve powerful, dynamic concentrations where the adversary is vulnerable.

3. In wartime, it is important that support is anticipatory and precise. Intelligence must maximize and synchronize its support to the JFC while minimizing the demands made on the JFC. **(JP 2-0, Chapter I, para 2)**

III. Tenets of Intelligence.

A. The **tenets of intelligence** are the fundamental standards against which performance of intelligence personnel and organizations must be judged. A failure to achieve any one of these fundamental attributes may contribute to a failure of operations. The bottom line is whether the commander's PIR are being satisfied.

B. The threats of intelligence are as follows:

1. **Timeliness**

a. Intelligence must be available when the commander requires it. Late intelligence is as useless as no intelligence.

b. Timely intelligence enables the commander to anticipate events in the operational area. This enables the commander to time operations for maximum effectiveness and to avoid being surprised.

2. **Accuracy**

a. To be accurate, intelligence must be objective. It must be free from any political or other constraint and must not be distorted by pressure to conform

with the positions held by higher levels of command. Intelligence products must not be shaped to conform to any perceptions of the commander's preferences.

b. While intelligence is a factor in determining policy, policy must not determine intelligence.

3. **Usability**

a. Intelligence must be tailored to the specific needs of the commander and provided in forms suitable for immediate comprehension.

b. The commander must be able to quickly apply intelligence to the task at hand.

c. Providing useful intelligence requires the producers to understand the circumstances under which their products are used.

4. **Completeness**

a. Complete intelligence answers the commander's questions about the adversary to the fullest degree possible.It also tells the commander what remains unknown.

b. To be complete, intelligence must identify all the adversary's capabilities. It must inform the commander of the possible courses of action that are available to the adversary commander.

c. When justified by the available evidence, intelligence must forecast future adversary actions and intentions.

5. **Relevance**

a. Intelligence must be relevant to the planning and execution of the operation at hand. It must aid the commander in the accomplishment of the command's mission.

b. Intelligence must contribute to the commander's understanding of the adversary. It must help the commander decide how to accomplish the assigned mission without being unduly hindered by the adversary. **(JP 2-0, Chapter II, para 3)**

IV. Levels of Intelligence.

A. There are three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels are a doctrinal concept that explain the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions.

B. The levels of war assist commanders in visualizing a logical flow of operations,

allocating resources, and assigning tasks. The **levels of intelligence** mirror the levels of war.

1. **Strategic intelligence** is produced for the NCA, the senior military leaders, and the combatant commanders.

   a. It is used to create national strategy and policy, monitor the international situation, prepare military plans, determine major weapon systems and force structure requirements, and conduct strategic operations.

   b. It applies across the range of military operations including MOOTW.

2. **Operational intelligence** is primarily used by combatant and subordinate joint force commanders and their component commanders.

   a. Operational intelligence focuses on the military capabilities and intentions of adversaries and potential adversaries.

   b. It keeps JFCs abreast of events within their areas of responsibility and determines when, where, and in what strength the adversary will stage and conduct campaigns and major operations.

   c. Within the theater, operational intelligence addresses the full range of military operations including operations other than war.

3. **Tactical intelligence** is used by tactical level commanders for planning and conducting battles and engagements.

   a. Tactical intelligence locates the adversary's forces and weapon systems, enhancing the tactical commander's ability to shape the battlespace with maneuver, fires, and obstacles.

   b. Accurate, timely intelligence allows tactical units to achieve positional advantage over their adversaries.

   c. Tactical intelligence addresses threat across the range of military operations including MOOTW. **(JP 2-0, Chapter III, para 2)**

V. The Intelligence Cycle.

A. **The intelligence cycle** is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. Department of Defense users include the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders (CINCs), and all other commanders and forces.

B. The US intelligence cycle has the following six steps: planning and direction; collection, processing and exploitation; production; dissemination and integration; and

evaluation. The intelligence cycle is a highly simplified model of intelligence operations in terms of processes.

1. As a model, it is important to note that intelligence actions do not always follow sequentially through the cycle. For instance, a request for imagery causes activity in the planning and direction step but may not involve new collection, going instead to a production facility where imagery is drawn from an archive.

2. The intelligence cycle, however, presents intelligence activities as a structure for the discussion of intelligence doctrine.

C. To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence.

1. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence.

2. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence. Both information and intelligence are important, and both may exist together in some form. They are not, however, the same thing, and thus they have different connotations, applicability, and credibility.

D. **Planning and Direction Phase**

1. In the planning and direction phase, the direction for current and future intelligence operations is established by the commander's PIR and by the J-2's supporting information requirements (IR).

2. Using the PIR and IR as guidance, intelligence personnel then perform the necessary planning for how best to collect the information needed to satisfy the requirements. PIR are those intelligence requirements that the commander has specifically stated have priority.

3. Collection planning matches requests for intelligence with the appropriate collection capabilities. It also synchronizes the timing of collection with the operational scheme of maneuver.

   a. Collection planning registers, validates, and prioritizes all collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements. It results in requirements being tasked or submitted to the appropriate organic, attached, and supporting external organizations and agencies.

   b. The taskings take the form of the command's collection plan.

4. Planning and direction also entails determining the intelligence organizational and equipment requirements and creating the necessary intelligence architecture.

a. How the joint force J-2 will be organized and where it will be established are critical decisions that must be made early in the planning process.

E. **Collection Phase**. During the collection phase, those intelligence sources identified in the collection plan collect information about the adversary. The collected information is then provided to processing and exploitation elements.

1. Intelligence sources are the means or systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events.

2. There are five primary intelligence disciplines: imagery intelligence, human intelligence, SIGINT, measurement and signature intelligence, and open-source intelligence. **(JP 2-0, Chapter II, para 3)**

F. **Processing and Exploitation Phase**

1. During this phase, raw information is converted to forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts in the production phase.

   a. Processing and exploitation actions include initial interpretation, data conversion and correlation, document translation, and decryption.

   b. Also included are reporting the results of these actions to production elements. Process and exploitation may be performed by the same element that collected the information.

2. An example of processing and exploitation is taking the technical parameters detected by a SIGINT collection system and associating the parameters with a particular radar system. Rather than having to deal with raw data, the analyst is provided with the essential fact — the identity of the radar.

G. **Production Phase**

1. This is the most critical phase of the intelligence cycle. During the production phase, all available processed information is integrated, analyzed, evaluated, and interpreted to create products that will satisfy the commander's PIR.

2. Intelligence products can be presented in many forms. They may be oral presentations, hard copy publications, or electronic media.

H. **Dissemination and Integration Phase**

1. During this phase, intelligence is delivered to and used by the consumer. Dissemination can be by a variety of means. This means must be determined by the needs of the user.

2. Briefings, video-teleconferences, telephone calls, FAX transmissions, electronic messages, and remote terminal access to computer data bases and

direct data transfers are all forms of dissemination.

I. **Evaluation Phase**

1. During the evaluation phase, intelligence personnel at all levels assess how well each phase of the intelligence cycle is being performed.

2. When areas are identified that need improvement, the necessary changes are made.

3. The tenets of intelligence are the fundamental standards against which performance of intelligence personnel and organizations must be judged. The bottom line is whether the commander's PIR are being satisfied. **(JP 2-0, Chapter II, para 3)**

VI. Responsibilities of the Joint Force J-2.

A. To accomplish the tasks required of intelligence operations, the J-2s at all levels have the following major responsibilities.

1. **Participate in all Decision Making and Planning**. Using the intelligence estimate as a basis, the J-2 participates in the JFC's decision making and planning processes from the time that operations are first contemplated or directed until the completion of the operation.

2. **Synchronize Intelligence With Operations**

   a. The J-2 synchronizes all intelligence activities and functions with the JFC's operational scheme of maneuver.

   b. The employment of intelligence assets must be applied to provide maximum support at the critical times in the JFC's plan.

3. **Develop Detailed Intelligence Plans**

   a. The JFC's PIR and the results of wargaming serve as the basis for the intelligence plan.

   b. The plan will list the JFC's PIR and the supporting IR. If will identify the intelligence forces available for the operation and assign tasks that will best support the JFC's requirements.

4. **Plan to Use Operational Forces for Collection**

   a. Information from reconnaissance and surveillance units and elements that will be in contact with the adversary must be integrated with intelligence from other sources.

b. Forward and engaged combat forces must be tasked to collect and report information.

5. **Use Intelligence Lessons Learned When Planning**

a. The J-2 should take advantage of the lessons learned during other joint operations to benefit from significant operations, training, and intelligence experience.

b. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System is designed for this purpose and should be used.

6. **Establish a Joint Intelligence Architecture**

a. A truly joint intelligence infrastructure must be created to provide the best possible intelligence to the JFC.

b. The joint force command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) structure required to support the JFC's concept of operation must be identified during the planning or predeployment phases.

7. **Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort**. For a particular area of interest, there should be unity of intelligence effort to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication.

8. **Structure for Continuous Operations**

a. Intelligence organizations should be structured for continuous day-night and all-weather operations.

b. The J-2's concept of intelligence operations should provide for continuity of support even if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost.

c. Intelligence resources, activities, and communications must be structured and operated to be sufficiently survivable to ensure required intelligence support is available to the JFC.

9. **Maintain Flexibility.** Intelligence structures, methodologies, data bases, products, and personnel must be flexible to meet changing operational situations, needs, priorities, and opportunities and they must serve all possible strategies and tactics.

10. **Integrate National and Theater Intelligence Support**

a. The J-2 must plan for integrating national and theater intelligence elements and products into the joint force's intelligence structure.

b. National and theater intelligence organizations will make operations feasible that could not be accomplished without their access, capability, capacity, or expertise.

11. **Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence.** The J-2 must ensure that intelligence is readily accessible to the JFC and other members of the joint force while still adhering to security standards of need-to-know and protection of classified information and intelligence sources and methods. **(JP 2-0, Chapter III, para 4)**

VII. Joint Intelligence Architecture.

A. Since a JFC must be capable of coordinating the actions of people, organizations, and resources at a great distance, the joint intelligence architecture is critical. This intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure capable of providing global access to an information grid that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. It is configured to provide access to all intelligence sources from anywhere on the earth and to provide the baseline data needed to support JFCs at all levels.

B. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), supported by the national and military intelligence organizations, is responsible for establishing and maintaining the joint intelligence architecture at the national level and the CINCs are responsible for it for their commands. **(JP 2-0, Chapter IV, para 1)**

C. The joint intelligence architecture is integral to each phase of the intelligence cycle, from Planning and Direction through Evaluation. The architecture supports intelligence functions over a distributed global network employing communications systems, computers, space-based C4I support systems, and their associated resources and technologies. **(JP 2-0, Chapter IV, para 2)**

D. There are certain requirements that the joint intelligence architecture needs to fill for it to be successful.

1. It must be capable of being tailored to support a specific JFC's information requirements.

2. The architecture must ensure that no source of information collection, production, or dissemination is subject to a single point of failure.

3. It must be capable of accommodating the widest possible range of missions and operational scenarios. It is important that it achieve a seamless integration of the JFC's decision making and execution cycles with all phases of the intelligence cycle.

4. The architecture must be developed so that users can train and exercise with intelligence capabilities in peacetime.

5. It must include current technology and be capable of incorporating new and

emerging technologies as they become available.

6. Finally, the intelligence architecture must provide for integration with the existing and projected teleconferencing capabilities of C4I systems. **(JP 2-0, Chapter IV, para 3)**

E. The standards for the joint intelligence architecture are as follows.

1. **Survivable**: The architecture must be as survivable as the command structure it supports.

2. **Interoperable**: The architecture must be designed to accommodate interoperability and integration with existing and projected intelligence information systems.

3. **Secure**: Information must be protected according to a developed intelligence architecture security policy.

4. **Compatible**: The architecture must use common data elements when reengineering existing systems or applications and developing new systems. **(JP 2-0, Chapter IV, para 4)**

VIII. National Intelligence Support.

A. We know that it is the job of the J-2 to provide the JFC with timely and accurate intelligence. However, in almost every situation, the J-2 will not be capable of satisfying the commander's requirements using only the intelligence resources assigned to the joint force and its components. In most situations, even the theater-level intelligence system will be incapable of meeting all the commander's needs. The J-2 will have to rely upon national-level intelligence organizations for support. **(JP 2-02, Chapter I, para 1)**

B. **National intelligence organizations** operate extensive collection, processing, and dissemination systems.

1. They have broad, often unique, analytical capabilities.

2. These intelligence organizations employ specialized resources and dedicated personnel to gain information about potential adversaries, events, and other worldwide intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-02, Chapter I, para 2)**

C. While national-level intelligence organizations can and will provide support to the JFC, they must continue to support national-level decision makers.

1. The focus of these national organizations is not evenly split between the two customers and varies according to the situation.

2. Successful national-level support to JFCs depends upon efficient and effective

cooperation and interoperability, not only vertically but horizontally, as well. **(JP 2-02, Chapter I, para 4)**

D. Representatives from some national-level intelligence organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, DIA, National Security Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, and State Department, support the combatant commanders on a full time basis and are located at command headquarters. These representatives:

1. Provide liaison with their parent organizations; and

2. Serve as the J-2's advisor on how to best employ their organization's capabilities. **(JP 2-02, Chapter I, para 4)**

IX. Intelligence Planning

A. The essence of effective planning is the full definition of the mission, expression of the commander's intent, completion of the commander's estimate, and development of a concept of operations.

1. The planning effort must be focused to ensure that it is responsive to the commander's requirements and the requirements of subordinate units and/or elements.

2. Sharing operational, communications and intelligence information among the J-2, operations officer, logistics officer, plans officer, and command, control, communications, and computer systems officer is essential.

B. Joint operation plans OPLANs, CONPLANs with or without TPFDD, functional plans, campaign plans, and OPORDs. The different processes involved (deliberate planning, CAP, and campaign planning) are interrelated: . We will discuss these processes on the next slides.

C. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System provides the means to respond to emerging crisis situations or transition to war through rapid, coordinated execution planning and implementation. JOPES translates policy decisions into OPLANs and OPORDs. **(JP 2-01, Chapter II, para 1)**

X. Intelligence Planning Process 1: Deliberate Planning.

A. The next three slides will cover the planning process with relation to intelligence in the areas of deliberate, crisis action and campaign planning.

B. Intelligence planners support the deliberate planning process which prepares for a possible contingency based on the best available information. The deliberate planning process:

1. Is conducted primarily in peacetime; and

2. engages the entire joint planning community in the methodical development of plans for all contingencies, and the transition to and from war.

C. During Phase I, **Initiation**, the Services provide information to the supported commands on available intelligence forces and supplies required to support the plan. The Services also keep the combatant commander informed on Service intelligence plans and programs.

D. Phase II, **Concept Development,** involves development of the supported commander's concept of the operation, documented as the CINC's Strategic Concept.

1. The intelligence staff supports the development of alternative COAs by collecting and analyzing already existing information to produce intelligence on the adversary, terrain, meteorological and oceanographic and geographic features that affect friendly and adversary forces through the intelligence preparation of the battlespace process.

2. The CINC's Strategic Concept is forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

E. The CINC's Strategic Concept provides the basis for plan development by the CINC's staff.

1. In Phase III, **Plan Development**, intelligence staffs are responsible for developing the Intelligence Annex and appendices to the basic OPLAN.

2. Intelligence staffs must also identify intelligence support force and sustainment requirements and identify intelligence shortfalls throughout the planning process for incorporation into the OPLAN.

3. Intelligence assets must be included in the time-phased force and deployment list to ensure proper movement of critical personnel and equipment.

F. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a final review of OPLANs submitted by the supported commander during Phase IV, **Plan Review**.

1. This review evaluates the plan to determine whether taskings have been met and whether resources have been used effectively within the constraints of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan apportionment guidance.

2. The Joint Staff J-2 reviews the intelligence annex for the the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

G. Phase V, **Supporting Plans**, deals with mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in support of the concept described in the supported commander's approved plan.

1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be asked to resolve critical issues, including use of intelligence forces and assets, that arise during the review of supporting plans.

2. The Joint Staff may review any supporting plan on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **(JP 2-01, Chapter II, para 2)**

XI. Intelligence Planning Process 2: Crisis Action Planning

A. The basic planning process is adapted to execute joint operations in crisis situations. **CAP** procedures provide for the transition from planning military operations to actual execution through the timely flow of intelligence, rapid execution of military options, and the timely relay of decisions of the NCA to supported commanders.

B. Deliberate and crisis action planning for any particular joint operation are interrelated by the degree to which deliberate planning has been able to anticipate and prepare for the crisis.

1. Every crisis situation cannot be anticipated, but detailed analysis and coordination accomplished during the deliberate planning period may greatly expedite effective decision making and execution planning during crises and unanticipated contingencies.

2. Therefore, joint intelligence support for CAP should always begin with a thorough exploitation of relevant deliberate plans.

C. CAP and execution are accomplished within a framework of six phases. Following are the processes and procedures pertinent to joint intelligence planning during CAP.

1. **Situation development** is a dynamic process that evolves simultaneously with policy. Proper situation development demands that staffs be able to provide advice within approximately 12 hours to commanders, based on deliberate planning.

   a. A principal task of the combatant command's J-2 is to help develop the commander's situation assessment.

   b. The intelligence effort focuses on intelligence collection and production to illuminate the situation for the combatant commander, components, JFC, NCA, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   c. The situation development phase ends when the CINC's assessment is submitted to the NCA and the the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. During Phase II, **crisis assessment**, the NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation assessment and determine whether a military option should be

prepared.

a. This phase requires increased information gathering and analysis, particularly with respect to potential strategic lift destinations. Therefore, the combatant command J-2 must work closely with national agencies to help define and then answer the emerging information requirements of the senior leadership and answer the commander's PIR.

b. The crisis assessment phase ends with a decision by the NCA to return to the pre-crisis state or to have military options developed for consideration and possible use.

c. The NCA decision provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include specific guidance on the COAs to be developed.

3. Phase III, **COA development**, implements an NCA decision or CJCS planning directive to develop military options.

   a. The supported commander analyzes each COA and provides recommendations to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   b. This phase ends with submission of the supported commander's estimate, which includes the intelligence estimate.

4. Two critical events highlight Phase IV, **COA selection**: selection of a COA by the NCA and initiation of execution planning.

   a. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews and evaluates the combatant commander's estimate and prepares recommendations and advice for the NCA.

   b. The NCA selects a COA and directs that execution planning be accomplished. An alert order implements the NCA decision and contains sufficient detail to allow the JFC to conduct detailed planning.

   c. A CJCS planning order could be issued to initiate execution planning before the NCA selects a COA.

   d. The subordinate joint force J-2 planning action focus shifts to the COA selected by the NCA.

5. Phase V, **execution planning**, begins with receipt of the alert order or planning order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   a. The approved COA is transformed into an OPORD. Detailed planning occurs throughout the joint planning community.

b. If required, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already developed.

c. The supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or developing a new plan.

d. This phase ends with an NCA decision to implement the OPORD. In those instances where the crisis does not progress to implementation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance on continued planning using either deliberate or crisis action planning procedures.

6. If the NCA decide to execute the selected COA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an execute order during Phase VI, **execution**.

a. This phase continues until the crisis or mission ends and force redeployment has been completed.

b. If the crisis is prolonged, the process may be repeated continuously as circumstances change and missions are revised.

c. If the crisis expands to major conflict or war, CAP will evolve into and be absorbed within the larger context of implementation planning for the conduct of the war. **(JP 2-01, Chapter II, para 3)**

XII. Intelligence Planning Process 3: Campaign Planning

A. The theater campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's vision of related major operations required to attain strategic objectives.

1. Campaign planning is appropriate when military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.

2. It encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. Intelligence supports all aspects of the campaign plan.

B. Campaign plans guide the development of supporting OPLANs and OPORDs. COAs are developed and forwarded in the commander's estimate for approval by the NCA.

1. The combatant commander finalizes the campaign plan based on a CJCS alert order, using the approved COA as the centerpiece.

2. Intelligence efforts in support of the campaign plan, including the intelligence annexes, focus on identifying any adversary forces and capabilities in the area of responsibility and/or the joint operations area and the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity. **(JP 2-01, Chapter II, para 4)**

XIII. Geospatial Information and Services Support

A. The term "geospatial information and services (GI&S)" has recently replaced the term "mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G)." This change was necessitated by an increasing use of digital geospatial information to perform many military functions such as navigation, mission planning and mission rehearsal, targeting, and analysis of the battlespace. Digital geospatial information forms the foundation for battlespace visualization. All aspects of military operations require geospatial information. **(JP 2-03, Chapter I, para 1)**

B. GI&S is neither a product nor a system, but rather a concept for the collection, production, archiving, dissemination, and exploitation of information about the Earth. The purpose of the geospatial data warehouse is to allow the warfighter to have instant access to the most current and accurate geospatial information available. **(JP 2-03, Chapter I, para 2)**

XIV. Intelligence C4 Systems Support

A. **Communications and ADP systems provide the basic framework for the timely movement and transfer of information in each phase of the intelligence cycle to commanders and other key decision makers.**

1. Communications and ADP technology is undergoing continuous evolution, affecting intelligence architecture, systems, and applications.

2. This presents challenges regarding operator familiarization, integration and compatibility of systems, and efficient utilization of available resources.

3. These challenges can be overcome through dedicated, professional training and hands-on experience.

B. Developers, installers, and other ADP professionals must continuously raise the threshold of dynamic support to commanders by successfully creating and refining communications and ADP systems.

1. However, integral to all system development and application is the need for utility — technology is not an end in itself, but the means to process and pass intelligence in support of the commander and the mission.

2. Technological development must be realistically tempered by the limitations of fielded and deployed systems and of the consumers themselves. **(JP 2-01, Chapter IV, para 1)**

C. **Joint Intelligence**

1. Joint intelligence architecture implements common procedures, standards, and streamlined support, and continues to evolve in concert with the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) for

the Warrior Concept.

2. This broadly connected joint system provides total battlespace information to the warrior, and establishes a global C4I capability for the warfighter to "plug in" anytime, anywhere, for any mission.

D. **National Agency Communications Support**

1. The Director, DIA, establishes capability and interoperability standards for joint and Service intelligence activities.

2. The Director coordinates planning and programming of intelligence resources, including those for selected ADP systems, telecommunications, and survivability.

3. DIA has established a standard communications architecture that supports joint intelligence operations.

4. The geographic combatant command then takes this standard "package," and in coordination with DIA, builds a theater intelligence architecture based on the mission, CINC guidance, and command requirements. **(JP 2-01, Chapter IV, para 2)**

E. Combined operations and coalition warfare are now the norm for military operations, making intelligence-sharing with the allies increasingly important**.**

1. A multilevel security system does not currently exist that can easily facilitate sanitization and dissemination of information to US and allied and/or coalition operational commanders. Combatant commands and subordinate joint task forces can request that intelligence reports be made releasable to coalition and/or allied nations as necessary. **(JP 2-01, Chapter IV, para 3)**

XV. Target Intelligence.

A. **Target intelligence** describes components of a target or target system and indicates their vulnerability and relative importance. Intelligence support to targeting includes target system analysis, target development, target selection and nomination, weaponeering, CA, and target material production.

B. Targeting is the process of developing and selecting targets in response to the commander's guidance, objectives, and the commander's preparation of the battlespace and scenario, and matching the appropriate weapon system to them by taking into account existing operational requirements and capabilities. The targeting cycle concludes with CA which determines the effectiveness of operations in meeting combat or battle objectives, and is the start of the retasking cycle.

C. The primary responsibility for targeting resides with the JFC. Targeting entails the

analysis of enemy situations relative to the mission, objectives, and the capabilities at the JFC's disposal, in order to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or critical resources. **(JP 2-01.1, Chapter I, para 2)**

D. Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force by operations and intelligence personnel.

1. It is sometimes complicated by the need to deconflict or synchronize targeting by different units within the joint force.

2. Targeting should be based on campaign goals, intent, guidance, military objectives, and the Law of Armed Conflict, and a thorough understanding of how the adversary state functions.

3. The targeting process is cyclical and the J-2 provides critical support throughout this process, especially in the areas of target development and CA.

E. The targeting cycle includes six steps: NCA/commander's guidance and objectives; target development; weaponeering assessment; force application; execution planning and force execution; and CA.

1. **NCA and/or Commander's Guidance and Objectives**

   a. Guidance and objectives from the NCA, as well as joint force and component commanders, serve to initiate the targeting cycle.

   b. Objectives and guidance also drive targeting priorities, establish restrictions for force employment, drive intelligence requirements, and provide criteria to measure objective attainment.

2. **Target Development**

   a. This phase focuses on knowing the adversary and identifying and nominating critical elements of adversary target systems for attack.

   b. The target development phase involves the systematic evaluation of all-source intelligence to identify potential target systems relevant to the commander's guidance and objectives.

3. **Weaponeering Assessment**. In this phase, targeting personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and nonlethal weapons employment against prioritized targets.

4. **Force Application**

   a. Force application integrates the results of earlier phases with operations

planning data.

b. Force application is conducted at the command, component, and unit level to fuse target, weapon system, munitions, and nonlethal force options.

c. The JFC is provided fused target intelligence and weapon system recommendations against a target system and its vulnerabilities.

5. **Execution Planning and Force Execution.** Following the commander's approval of force application recommendations, this next phase involves final tasking order preparation and transmission and specific mission planning and material preparation at the unit level.

6. **Combat Assessment**

a. CA is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations.

b. Battle damage assessment is one of the principal subordinate elements of CA.

c. At the JFC level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign or OPLAN are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC's overall concept.

d. The intent is to analyze what is known about the damage inflicted on the adversary with sound military judgment to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have on the adversary's plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. **(JP 2-01.1, Chapter I, para 3)**

XVI. Multinational Intelligence Principles

A. As our last topic we will consider **multinational intelligence principles**. National interests require the United States to act in concert with other nations.

1. In many situations, Armed Forces of the United States will join with foreign military forces to defeat common adversaries or to conduct MOOTW.

2. In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. **(JP 2-0, Appendix A, para 1)**

3. Because each multinational operation will be unique, there is no fixed set of rules or policies for conducting joint intelligence operations as part of

multinational operations. The JFC participating in the coalition or alliance must develop the policy and procedures for that particular operation.

B. The following general principles provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures:

1. **Maintain Unity of Effort**. Intelligence officers of each nation need to view the threat from multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of an alliance or coalition by the common adversary must be considered a threat to all alliance or coalition elements.

2. **Make Adjustments**. There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among the coalition partners. Major differences may include how intelligence is provided the commander or procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.

3. **Plan Early and Plan Concurrently**. This permits solutions to differences to be developed and tried before operations begin.

4. **Share All Necessary Information**. Coalition members must share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary.

5. **Conduct Complementary Operations**. Intelligence efforts of the nations must be complementary and all intelligence resources must be available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem.

XVII. Conclusion

A. The role intelligence plays in successful operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and determine when that end state has been achieved.

B. Today I have advised you of many aspects of intelligence including the definition and sources, the intelligence cycle, the role intelligence plays in joint operations, planning, basic principles, target intelligence, and finally the principles of multinational intelligence.